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BANKRUPTCY-INCoME TAXES DUE ON ADJUDICATION-STATUTE OF LimITATION-A corporation, adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt on November 3,
ig2, had not paid its federal income tax for the year 1917, which had been
duly assessed against it on the basis of its return filed April 1, 1918. The
collector notified the trustee in bankruptcy of the existence and amount of
the claim during March, 1923 (four years and eleven months after the tax
return was filed), but the government did not put in a proof of claim until
August, 1923. The referee pronounced an order disallowing the claim as barred
under Section 25o(d) of the Revenue Act of x9aI
On review of the order
of the referee. Held, that the appointment of the trustee in bankruptcy suspended the operation of the statute of limitation. In re Chandler Motors, 17
F.(2d) 998, 9 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 627 (D. C. Mass., 1926).
The question whether debts due on adjudication in bankruptcy can be subsequently barred by limitation provisions other than those in the Bankruptcy
Act itself, has arisen before in connection with the claims of private persons,
and courts have differed as to the correct principle.a The point has never been
passed on by the Supreme Court of the United States and this is the first time
the question has been raised in connection with government claims. It is a
well-established doctrine that the government does not have to file a proof of
claim against a bankrupt's estate within the customary period, in order to
make it the trustee's duty to pay the government claims before those of private
persons, provided the trustee knows that the claims are due.' Because of this
peculiarity of government claims, the court did not feel that it was necessary
to base its decision on the correct principle as to private claims, but decided
that the government, without filing proof of claim, acquires a cestui que trust
interest as soon as the trustee is vested with the property, and therefore from
that time the statute of limitation ceases to run against its claims. However,
the doctrine that the trustee, before paying the claims of private individuals
duly proved, must pay taxes that he knows are due, even though the government has not filed formal proof within the required period, rests on the theory
that the government as a sovereign power is not affected by the provisions of
1

This provides that "no suit for the collection of" this tax can be "begun,
after the expiration of five years after the date when such return was filed."
42 STAT. 265 (92),
U. S. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1923) §63361tt, repealed by 43
STAT. 352 (1924), U. S. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1925) §63719t, but replaced by
simila provisions 43 STAT. 29 (1924), U. S. C. (925) TIT. XXVI §1057. And
see also 44 STAT. 125 §1200(a) and 44 STAT. 58 §277(a) (1926).
' The- majority view is that as soon as the property of the bankrupt is
vested in the trustee, he becomes a trustee for the creditors, and from that time
the limitation provisions cease to run against their claims. Ex parte Ross, 2 Gl.
& J. 46 (1825); In re Eldridge, Fed. Cas. No. 4331 (1875); WooD, LIMrrATIONS (4th ed. 1916). §2o2; (I923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 325. The minority view is
that a creditor only acquires his cestui que trust interest as of the time he files
proof of claim. *Nicholas v. Murray, Fed. Cas. No. 10,223 (C. C. Or. 1878);
In re Cornwall, 6 Nat. B. R. 305 (C. C. Conn. 187o).
'In re Brezin, 297 Fed. 300, 4 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 503 (D. C. N. J. 1924);
U. S. v. Egyes, 286 Fed. 683, 4 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 86 (D. C. Mass. i923);
Lewis v. U. S., 92 U. S. 618 (0875).
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the Bankruptcy Act' which require proof of claim within a certain period on
pain of the debts being cancelled by discharge, because it is not especially mentioned.' This principle would place the government claims above the limitations
mentioned in the Bankruptcy Act, but would not relieve it from the penalty
expressly provided for its laches in the Revenue Act. It is submitted that, in
the latter regard, government claims must stand on the same basis as the claims
of private persons, and the distinctive treatment of them on which this court
bases its decision does not follow easily from the precedents on which it is
based.
BILLS AND NoT-s-LnArriTY OF AGENT'S BANK OF DEosIT WHERE AamT
To His INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT CHEcKS DRAwN BY Him ON
PRINCIPAL'S FUNDS-The United States Supreme Court has held that checks
drawn by an agent on his principal's bank account, payable to his own order,
under a general power of attorney, and endorsed and deposited by the agent
in his personal account with the agent's bank, do not by their form and contents put the agent's bank on notice and do not render such bank liable for a
misuse of the funds by the agent. Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 47 Sup. Ct. 661
(1927).
This is a reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, 9 F. (2d) 713 (I926). See Note (1926). 75 U. OF PA.
L. Rrv. 64.

HAs DEPosITD

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FLEXIBLE TARIFF-A writ of certiorariin the case
of J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States was granted by the United
States Supreme Court, June 6, 1927. 47 Sup. Ct. 769. The suit was instituted
to determine the validity of the Tariff Act of z922, Section 3X5, purporting to
give the President the power to increase or decrease rates of duties upon
imports. See (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 176.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEsS OF LAW-PROCESS-SERVICE OF
PROCESS ON NONRESIDENT MOTORiSTS-A Massachusetts statute' provides that

the use of the highways by nonresident motorists would be deemed equivalent
to the appointment of the state registrar as the nonresidents' attorney on whom
process, could be served in actions arising from highway accidents. Defendant,
a resident of Pennsylvania, struck and injured the plaintiff in Massachusetts.
Service was made on the registrar, and notice was sent to the defendant by
registered mail as the statute" required. The defendant claimed that the
statute was unconstitutional, depriving him of property without due process of
44

'3o STAT. 56I §57(n) (1898), U. S. C. (1925)
666 §13 (1926).

TIT. XI §93(n), amended by

STAT.

'Supra note 3.
'Cf. In re Anderson, 279 Fed. 525, 48 Am. B. IL 350 (C. C.'A. 2d, 1922);
and cases .supra note 3.
'Miss. GEN. LAWS" (1921) c. 90 §3, as amended by Acts, 1923 C. 43i §2.
'Supra note I.
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law. Held, that the statute is constitutional. Hess v. Pawloskd, 47 Sup. Ct. 632
(U. S. 1927).
4
The basis of jurisdiction is physical control within territorial limits.' In
of
actual service on the defendant
sort
some
actions in personam' there must be
within the jurisdiction.' Where the defendant is a nonresident of the state any
form of constructive or extra-jurisdictional service is void, and will not support
a personal judgment. The validity of the act in question was upheld as being
a reasonable exercise of Massachusetts' police power! As the Court points out,
a state has the power to regulate motor vehicles on its highways ' even though
such regulations affect interstate commerce." In Kane v. State of New Jersey,"
which the Supreme Court deemed controlling in this case, a state law forbidding
nonresident motorists to enter the state unless they expressly appointed an
official as their attorney to receive process was upheld as a reasonable exercise
of this police power. The Court in the present case said that insofar as the due
process clause' was concerned there is no substantial difference between a
formal and an implied appointment. The decision seems proper, but police
power is broad,1 ' and if service on nonresidents can be upheld under such a
broad power, it is likely to be extended to more classes of cases than the one
in question.
'Aff'g. 250 Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 76o (1924) affirmed by 253 Mass. 478, x49
N. E. 122 (1925). See Note (1925) 9 MINN. L. REv. 362 and 381, and (1924)
9 VA. L. Rav. z44.
"McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 9o (1917). Holmes, J., at 9i says: "The
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . "
'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (877); Goldey v. Morning News, I56
U. S. 518 (1895) ; Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289 (I919).
'Different rules apply to actions to settle status and to actions in rem.
T
Pennoyer v. Neff, Goldey v. Morning News, Flexner v. Farson, all supra
note 5, Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461 (I9O2).
'33 C. J. 1o85 et seq.: "But merely constructive or substituted service, or
personal service made beyond the limits of the state, will not support a personal judgment against a nonresident; personal service within the jurisdiction
or voluntary appearance is essential, unless the party has agreed in advance
to accept, or does in fact accept, some other form of service as sufficient."
Pennoyer v. Neff, Goldey v. Morning News, Flexner v. Farson, all supra note
5, Graf v. Cabanne, supra note 7.
'Butler, J., in the principal case, said, "In the public interest the state
may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on
the part of all, residents and nonresidents alike, wfio use its highways."
" Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235 U. S. 6io (915) ; State v. Swagerty,
203 Mo. 517,102 S. W. 483 (19o7).
'Hendrick v. State of Maryand, supra note io.
1242
U. S. 619 (i916).
UNITED STATEs CoNsTrruTioN, Amendment XIV, §i.
""The scope of police power has been much broadened in American
jurisprudence, and by some writers, until it is as comprehensive as sovereignty
itself, whereas it originally was, and now ought to be a distinctive power of
the sovereign, as applied to specific objects." Wnus R. BiE.LY, POLICE
(i907) 8.
POWER STATE AND FEDER.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS--STERILIZATION
STATUTE-The superintendent of the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and
Feeble Minded ordered, under the procedure outlined in a state statute,' the
operation of salpingectomy to be performed upon a feeble minded white woman,
an inmate of the institution, for the purpose of making her sterile. The statute
was attacked as being void under the Fourteenth Amendment in that it denied
the mental defective due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
Held, that the statute was constitutional. Buck v. Bell, 47 Sup. Ct. 584
(U. S. 1927).

For the first time the United States Supreme Court considered, in the
principal case, the constitutionality of a sterilization statute. The question
of whether or not a state has the power to sterilize all of a particular class,
i. e., mental defectives, in the exercise of its police power has been answered
2
in the affirmative in the state court decisions on the questions, if the power
is exercised under a statute providing for due process of law and affecting alike
all individuals of the class designated. But where the statute "carves.a class
out of a class"' and applies only to mental defectives in state institutions
the courts of New Jersey,' New York,5 , and Michigan' have declared such
sterilization statutes void as class legislation. While' the Virginia statute
equally applies only to those mental defectives in state institutions, the contention that it is class legislation was answered by saying~that, "the law does
all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to
all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so
far and so fast as the means allow."' This is not the test which our state
courts have applied. But the Supreme Court has seen fit to broaden the rule
to achieve a desirable solution of a prepleling modem problem.
CORPORATIONS-IMPUTING STOCEHOLDER'S WRONGFUL AcT TO THE CORPORATION-The plaintiff corporation contracted with the defendant insurance

company for fire insurance to cover a building, machinery, fixtures, and supplies. The plaintiff's general manager owned one-fourth of the corporate
stock and was in complete control of its business. Fire destroyed the property
covered, but the insurance company refused to pay the loss on the ground that
the plaintiff's general manager caused the property to be burned in order to
profit by the payment of the insurance money. Held, that the corporation
1

VA. CODE ANN. (1924)

§iog5h.

Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140 (1925);

State of Washington v. Peter Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912).
Note, 41 L. R. A. (N. s.) 418 (1912).

See

'Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, supra note 2, at 421, 204 N. W. at 143.

'Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N. J. L. 46, 88 Atl. 963 (1913).
'Osborn v. Thomson, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1094 (3d Dept.
1918), aff'g. 103 Misc. 23, 169 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
sHaynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 2oI Mich. 138, I66 N. W. 938 (r918),

See Note, L. R. A. I9I8D 233.
'Holmes, J., in principal case at 585.
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could not recover. Kimball Ice Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 18 F.(2d) 563
(C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
The general rule is that a corporation is not responsible for the wrongful acts of its stockholders, officers or agents unless it authorizes them so to
act.1 And it has been said that the willful burning of property by a stockholder
or agent of a corporation without its participation or authority would not
be a defense against collection of the insurance by the corporation? A few
cases have properly departed, however, and barred recovery where the wrongful actor was the sole stockholder,' or would benefit as sole creditor,4 if the
corporation recovered. These cases have disregarded the corporate entity to
prevent a man gaining a benefit through his own fraud. The problem is to
determine what degree of ownership of the corporation and how much power
over its policies must exist in the individual in order to attribute his wrongful acts to the corporation. If the wrongdoer was "authorized to act as the
corporation in the primary sense of formulating for it its policies and directing
its conduct as is the duty generally of the directors, and . . . caused the
fire to be set for the purpose- of advantaging the corporation,"' and would
receive the greater part of the proceeds, being in fact identical with the corporation, then the corporation would be properly barred from recovery. The
general manager, in the present case owned but one-fourth the stock, and to
attribute his act to the corporation is rather harsh on the other officers and
stockholders who apparently were innocent of any fraud.

DESCENT AND DISTRIBuTIoN-PRivuEGE To PURCHASE REALTY ON PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND LEGACIES-A, in his will, provided that his two sons

should have the privilege to buy his farm at a certain price if they paid the
indebtedness on the premises and specified bequests to others. It was further
provided that if the sons did not "desire to purchase -the said farm . . .
then it is my will that the said land be sold on as favorable terms as possible."
The sons complied with the terms of the will and became the holders of record of the property. On the death of one of the sons, intestate, the court was
petitioned to construe the will of A, in order to make proper disposition of the
intestate's interest in the realty obtained from his father. By statute, if the
'Vowles v. Yakish, 191 Iowa 368, 179 N. W. II7 (1921); BALLANTINE,
(Ist ed. 1927) § 91. See Northern Assurance Co. v..
Rachlin Clothes Shop, 125 Atl. 184, 188, i9o (Del. 1924).
' See Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assurnce Company, Ltd., 284 Ill. 343,
12o N. E. 268 (I918).
Also see Meily Co. v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins.
Co. 148 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 3d, I9O6).
'Kirkpatrick v- Allemannia Fire Ins. Co., io2 App. Div. 327, 97 N. Y.
Supp. 466 (I9O5); Meily Co. v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. s-upra
note 2.
'Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assurance Co., Ltd. supra note 2 (in this
case the stockholders had hypothecated their stock as security to the creditor
for his claim and the insurance money would be paid to him solely).
'See Northern Assurance Co. v. Rachlin Clothes Shop, supra note i, at
19o (this is the test that the court gave as a guide to the jury to determine
the problem here involved).
PRIVATE CoRpoRATIoNs
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real property was non-ancestral, the proceeds from the sale of the intestate's
share should pass to the surviving sister of full blood; if ancestral (by devise
or succession), the proceeds should pass in equal shares to all of the brothers
and sisters of the decedent, both of the whole and half blood of the ancestor
Held, (three judges dissenting) that the real
from whom the estate came
estate passed to the two sons under the will of A as non-ancestral property.
Naus v. Vorndran, 156 N. E. 450 (Ohio 1927).
The decision expressly reverses the case of Wheatcraft v. Hall,' decided
a few years ago by the same court. The general language of the
court in the earlier case is to the effect that it is settled law that a devise to
an intestate subject to the payment of legacies constitutes ancestral
property. But the use of the word "devise" is really begging the question;
and only one authority' -is cited for the general proposition, this authority
holding that payment merely lessens the value of the gratuity, but does not
alter its character as a devise, unless there is an expressed intention to make
a sale of the property. On the ground that there was a clear indication of intention to make a devise, the court in the instant case finds no fault with the
decision in an early Ohio case" which held a clause reading: "I . . . bequeath and devise to my son all the remainder of my real estate . . . after
he shall pay . . ." to be a devise. In Wheatcraft v. Hall, the will read:
"It is my will that my son . . . shall have the farm . . . by paying"
certain specified sums to members of the testator's family.' It would seem
the conclusion reached in this case is the logical one, giving effect to the
expressed intention of the testator, this intention being clearly evidenced by
the use of the words "buy" and "purchase" in the terms of the proposed conveyance. Relationship of the grantees to the testator should not operate to
change what is intended as a purchase into a devise. The power of the testator
to impart to the disposition of real property the character of a conveyance
for consideration rather than a deed of gift has often been upheld, the deed
being regarded as one of purchase."

EVIDENcE-ADMISSIBILITY

OF CONVICTION FOR ADULTERY

IN AN ACTION

DiVoRcE--The defendant was convicted of adultery after a plea of not
guilty. In a libel for divorce by the injured spouse, in which the guilty party
defaulted, the master excluded the record of conviction. Held, that the record of conviction should have been admitted.. Tucker v. Tucker, 137 At. 404
(N. J. Ch. 1927).
• In general, the judgment in a criminal case is not admissible in a civil
action as evidence of the facts upon which it was rendered, because the parties
FOR

'OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §8573-4.
2 io6 Ohio 21, 138 N. E. 368 (1922).
'Kinney
'Case v.
'Gardner
65 Ohio 442,

v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. 141 (1866).
Hall, 52 Ohio 24, 38 N. E. 618 (i894).
v. Kern, 115 Ohio 575, 155 N. E. 134 (1926); Groves v. Groves,
62 N. E. io44 (igoi).
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and the subject matter are not identical
In the principal case the record of
conviction wAas admitted, not as probative evidence of adultery, but as persuasive evidence, to satisfy the conscience of the Chancellor to grant a divorce
on the unsupported affidavit of the libellant. Where the defendant pleads
guilty, the judgment is admissible in a libel for divorce by the innocent spouse,
even in another state, since the plea is a formal confession? A judgment upon
the guilty spouse in adultery has been admitted in a libel for divorce to prove
the marriage,' or, in a case of default by the guilty party, as evidence of
adultery.' By statute in Pennsylvania, a conviction 5 is substantive evidence of
adultery in a subsequent divorce suit, whether or not the defendant pleaded
guilty? The New Jersey court reached the same result in Tucker v. Tucker,
after default by the defendant, on the theory that, as the state is a party to
the divorce, two of the parties are the same as those in the criminal prosecution. Upon this reasoning, it would seem probable that New Jersey will limit
to cases of divorce the repudiation of the rule excluding criminal records in
civil actions.1
EviENcF_-ADmissmiLrry OF RECORD OF CONvCTioN-FEDERAL RuF,--In

a federal criminal trial in Idaho the defendant's counsel sought to discredit a
government witness by asking on cross-examination if he had not recently been
convicted of a crime. The rule of evidence of Idaho at the time it was admitted
to the Union limited such inquiry to convictions for felony. Held, that the
question was properly excluded. United States v. Fay, Ig F. (2d) 62o (S. D.
Idaho, 1927).

When United States v. Reid1 established in i85i that the provision of the
Judiciary Act of x.789' requiring current state laws to be used as rules of evi'U. S. v. Schneider, 35 Fed. io7 (C. C. Or. i888); Mead v. City of Bos-

ton, 57 Mass. 404 (1849), i GREENLEw, EVIDENCE (Wigmore's ed. I899) §537.

See Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U. S. 550, 598 (1848). But see Maybee v. Avery,
i8Johns. 351 (N. Y. i82o).
'Burgess v. Burgess, 47 N. H. 395 (1867). The judgment was admitted
in the same state in Bradley v. Bradley, ii Me. 367 (1834) ; Stewart v. Stewart,
93 N. J. Eq. I, 114 Atl. 851 (i92i).
'Anderson v. Anderson, 4 Me. 100 (1826).
See Note on this case in I6
Am. DEC. 237.
'Randall v. Randall, 4 Me. 326 (1826) (exactly like Tucker v. Tucker).
But record of conviction for assault and battery has been held inadmissible in
a subsequent hearing for divorce .if the innocent spouse testified on the prosecution. Woodruff v. Woodruff, II Me. 475 (1834) ; Quinn v. Quinn, i6 Vt. 426
(1844).
'The record of an acquittal in a prosecution for adultery has no value as
evidence in a libel for divorce by the innocent party. Virgo v. Virgo, 69 L. T.
R. (N. S.) 460 (1893) ; 2 BisHop, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPAIRATION (1891)
§1410.

'6 Sm. L. 288 §4 (I815), PA. STAT. (West, 192o) §9176.
'Since Randall v. Randall, supra note 4, the point has not been considered
in Maine, and seems not to have arisen elsewhere, in the absence of statute,
until Tucker v. Tucker.
12 How.361 (U. S. 185i).
ZI STAT. 92 (1789).

RECENT CASES
dence in federal trials "at common law" did not apply to criminal cases,' it held
that the federal criminal rules of evidence should be those in force in the several
states when the Act of 1789 was passed,' subject to change by Congress, but not
by the states. As Congress has made few changes,' the common law as it
stood in 1789 would today enforce outworn' prohibitions on admissibility of
evidence in federal criminal cases, were it not for liberalizing interpretations
of the Reid case made by federal courts in comparatively recent years. But
while modern conceptions have thus often been given effect in particular cases,
the failure of the courts consistently to apply either a foresighted theory or the
same theory has resulted in perplexing and needless variations in the rules of
evidence and a departure from the purposes of the Judiciary Act.! Within the
last twenty years three different policies as to the Reid case have intermittently'
been pursued by the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts have adopted
whichever they chose. These rules have been: (I) in states which were a
part of the United States in 1789 the common law rules of that date still prevail; ' (2) the common law rule of 1789 is overruled, and federal rules of
admissibility are to be determined on sound principle and in view of modern
'The Court reasoned that since property rights were acquired under state
laws, federal courts could do nothing else in civil cases but adopt the rules of
evidence of the state in which the court sat; but that to permit this in federal
criminal cases would be to allow states to dictate how offenses against the
United States should be tried.
' "It is obvious that it must have been the intention of Congress to refer
them to some known and established rule

. . . so familiar

. . . that

legislation on the subject would be deemed superfluous ;" a rule "which they
were accustomed to see in daily

. .

.

practice in the state courts."

Supra

note I,at 365.
'Congress has legislated concerning a few points of evidence in criminal
cases, such as: 20 STAT. 30 (1878), U. S. C. (925) TIT. XXVIII, §632 (making defendant competent to testify at his own request) ; 24 STAT. 635 (1887),
U. S. C. (1925) TIT. XXVIII §633 (making husband or wife of defendant
in cases of bigamy, etc., competent to testify).
'See Benson v. United States, 146 U. S.325 (1892).
T
Infra note 14.
'In 1911 in Hendrix v. United States, infra note ii, the Court held a witness incompetent to testify under the laws of Texas at time of its admission to
the Union. In 1918, in Rosen v. United States, infra note io,it held that
admissibility rules should no longer be governed by the "dead hand of the common law rule of 1789," and, ignoring the Hendrix case, supra, allowed a witness
to testify in New York who would have been incompetent by the New York
law of 1789. The same year, in Greer v. United States, 245 U. S.559 (1918),
it said, ".

.

.

. that the rules of evidence are not the same as in 1789 is

conclusively shown by Rosen v. United States." And in ig2o, in Jin Fuey Moy
v. United States, infra note 9,not mentioning the Rosen or the Greer cases,
it held a witness incompetent in Pennsylvania because he would have been incompetent under the law of 1789.
'J3n Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S. 189 (1920) ; Krashowitz v.
United States, 282 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922).
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legislation and decisions 0 (mainly of the states, of course) ; (3) in states admitted to the Union after 1789, the law of the state at the time of its admission
obtains in federal courts within the state.' It is the last-mentioned theory, now
widely adopted, which governs' the instant case. It is enlightening as to the
state of federal rules of evidence to note that while it is here held that for impeaching credibility a witness may be asked only about previous convictions of
the grade of felony, the Court of Appeals of the same circuit (ninth) was two
years previously ' obliged by adherence to the admission-date theory to hold
that under the law of Oregon when it was admitted to the Union evidence of
conviction of a misdemeanor was admissible. Instead of maintaining uniform
federal rules, which it was apparently"4 the purpose of the Act of 1789 to
establish, and which the above-mentioned policy' of overruling the old common
0

Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467 (i918) ; Chapman v. United States,
io F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925) ; Hurwitz v. United States, 299 Fed. 449
(C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
' Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79 (i911) ; Ding v. United States,
247 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 9th, i918) ; Withaup v. United States, 127 Fed. 530 (C.
C. A. 8th, i9o3). And see Logan v. United States, i44 U. S. at 303 (1892).
"Although the cases cited supra deal with competence instead of credibility of witnesses, which is involved in the instant case, both are rules of
evidence governed by similar considerations. Connecticut M. L. Ins. Co. v.
Union Trust Co., 112 U. S. 250, 254 (1884); I WIamolE, EviDENcE (1923)
§6, n.8. And see Neal v. United States, I F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924), a
credibility case arguing from Rosen v. United States, supra, a competency case.
No credibility cases have been found in the Supreme Court. It must be remembered that when conviction of certain crimes disqualified a witness from testifying altogether, as it did in 1789 and at the time of the admission of most of
the states up to about i85o, the question of credibility of such types of witnesses
was not involved; and frequently there is a lack of common law precedent,
which has made circuit courts of appeal decide on the basis of the general
trend of decisions and statutes throughout the country rather than follow the
rules of either the Moy case, supra note 9, or the Hendrix case, supra note ii.
In states admitted to the Union after about i85o, however, when credibility
questions had begun to be recognized, the rule of the Hendrix case may generally be applied.
' Merrill v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
" It is pointed out in the dissenting opinion of McCoy v. United States, 247
Fed. 861, at 866 (C. C. A. 5th, igi8), that though the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the federal rules of evidence should be the same as those of the
states in that year, Congress must have intended its criminal law to be uniform
everywhere; and as at that time the English common law as to evidence
obtained uniformly throughout the small territory of the then-existing states.
there was an intention by Congress to create one standard for the whole
country, the state rules probably being mentioned simply as explaining more
clearly that no new rule, but one long familiar, was being established. See
supra note 4. It seems as reasonable to argue with the McCoy dissenting opinion that Congress intended this in effect uniform rule to apply as new territory
was erected into states rather than that offenses against the United States
should be tried, say by the French law of Louisiana, as to accept the reasoning of the Logan, Hendrix, and Ding cases, all supra note ii, that as the western states were non-existent in 1789, the common law as of 1789 could not be
applied to them.
'Rosen v. United States, Chapman v. United States, Hurwitz v. United
States, all supra note io.
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law might accomplish if consistently followed, the policy of the instant case
substitutes many different rules, which do not even have the advantage of
coinciding with current state rules as in civil cases, and which, should Congress
not intervene, may in time become as much out of harmony with the spirit of
the times as the rules of evidence of 1789 are today.
INSOLVENCY-RIGHT TO APPLY DEPOSITS TO AN INSOLVENT'S UNMATUED
NorEs-Being advised by an officer of a corporation that the corporation was
insolvent, the bank appropriated deposits of the corporation and applied them
to the corporation's unmatured notes. The receivers who were appointed on
insolvency demanded the deposits but were refused, whereupon they brought
an action of assumpsit to recover the funds. Held, that the receivers could
recover as the bank had no right to apply the deposits to the unmatured notes.
Kurtz v. County National Bank of Clearfield, 288 Pa. 472, 136 Atl. 789 (1927).
1
The Kurtz case follows precedent in Pennsylvania, a minor court
decision being the only variance.' Although supported by a substantial" minority,' Pennsylvania is opposed in this rule by a majority of the states,'
the federal decisions,' and the bankruptcy laws. These courts allow an application of the deposits to the unmatured notes on the theory that insolvency
renders all debts due, and in the belief that equity demands it.' "A leading

'Blum Brothers v. Girard Nat. Bank, 248 Pa. 148, 93 Atl. 940 (1915);
Manufacturer's Nat. Bank v. Jones, 2 Pennyp. 377 (Pa. 1882) ; Dougherty v.
Central Nat. Bank, 93 Pa. 227 (1880).
'Stewart v. Bank, 6 W. N. C. 399 (Pa. 1879) (on the theory that equity
requires that the bank be protected).
'Homer v. Nat. Bank, 140 Mo. 225, 41 S. W. 790 (1897); Gerseta Co. v.
Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 241 N. Y. 418, 15o N. E. 5oi; Oatman v.
Batavian Bank, 77 Wis. 501, 46 N. W. 881 (i89o).
See Note, 43 A. L. R.
1325 (1926).
' Pendleton v. Hillman Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, 58 Cal. App.
448, 208 Pac. 7o2 (1922) ; Records v. McKim, 115 Md. 299, 8o Atl. 968 (1911);
Demmon v. Boylston Bank, 5 Cush. 194 (Mass. 1849).
'Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S. 5o6 (1897) ; Rolling Mill v. Ore & Steel Co.,
152 U. S. 596 (1894); Germania Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Loeb, 188 Fed.
285 (C. C. A. 6th, Ig1).
'See Eager, Set-off of Bank Deposit Against Indebtedness Under the
Bankruptcy Act (924), io VA. L. REV. 575 citing §§63a and 68 of the National
Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 562, 565 (1898), U. S. C. (925) TIT. II, §§o3, io8;
In re Semmer Glass Co., Ltd., 135 Fed. 77, 14 Am. B. R. 257 (C.C. A. 2d, i9o5);
Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892).
'Greene v. Farmer, 4 Burr. 2214 (Eng.' 1768) ; Pendleton v. Hillman
Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, Recordo v. McKim, Demmon v. Boylston
Bank, all supra note 4. See Clark, Set-off in Cases of Imtnature Claims in Insolvency and Receivership, (1921) 34 HARV. L. Rav. 178. The author asks,
"Why allow set-off if debt is due on the day of insolvency, and deny it if due
the day after?" The Kurtz case at 476 answers this by considering that by
the act of insolvency the rights of all creditors arise to demand consideration.
The disproportion between the amount of notes discounted and the amount of
the deposit shows the error in believing that the bank expected the running
balance to protect them in case of loss. The bank should protect themselves by
a special agreement.
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writer believes that the courts should be guided somewhat in their decisions
by the attitude of the bankruptcy statutes," and also that immediate set-off
should be allowed on the basis of implied promise and anticipatory breach.'
Pennsylvania cases deny an application of the funds because no right of set-off
existed before insolvency, and to grant such a right on insolvency would, they
reason, prejudice the rights of other creditors.'
INsURAcE-CoNsTRUcTIoN

OF CoNTRAcTr-DEL vmY-The defendant re-

ceived and accepted X's application for a life insurance policy, and forwarded
the policy to its local agent, to be delivered to X. The instrument contained
a provision that "this policy shall become void, if upon date of actual delivery
the insured is not alive and in sound health." While the policy was still in the
possession of the agent, X died, and plaintiff sues as beneficiary. Held, that
plaintiff should recover. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. Otto, 138 Atl.
16 (Md. 1927).
The obvious defense relied upon was that no actual delivery of the policy
had been consummated, but the court decided that the defendant's agent acted
as agent of the plaintiff in receiving the policy, and thus the provision in question was fully satisfied. The case illustrates the growing tendency of the law
to interpret the "adhesion" contracts of insurance companies as strictly as
possible against the insurers,' and the decision is in accord with most cases on
the point. However, the problem is an interesting one because of the varied
grounds on which liability is based. With similar facts it has been said that
an unconditional delivery to the agent is in law tantamount* or equivalent' to
an actual delivery to the insured. Likewise the ground has been taken that
having expressed an intent to actually deliver, the act of mailing the policy to
the agent is a constructive delivery.5 The agent has also been designated the
custodian of the policy for the insured,' and further the actual delivery is held
to be completed, because the insured, though not in possession of the policy, has
' See Clark, op. cit. supra note 7 at 183.
'See Clark, op. cit. supra note 7, at 182. Pennsylvania allows anticipatory
breach but never as here suggested. This is not between two parties since other
creditors' rights are involved.
"Blum Brothers v. Girard Nat. Bank, Daugherty v. Central Nat. Bank, both
supra note 1.
§§621, 675.
'N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Greenlee, 42 Ind. App. 82, 84 N. E. I101 (I9O8);
Porter y. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 70 Vt. 504, 41 Atl. 97o (1898);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Thomson, 94 Ky. 253, 22 S.W. 87 (1893);
12 Wn.uSTON, CoxrxAcrs (92o)

i COOLEY, BRIEFs ON INSURANCE (1905)

449.

'Thompson v. Mich. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 56 Ind. App 502, 105 N. E. 780
(9x4) ; Unterharnscheidt v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 16o Iowa 223, 1,38 N. W.
459 (1912).
'N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Rutherford, 284 Fed. 707 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1922).
"Jackson v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 7 F.(2d) 31 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
'Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Woodson, 256 S.W. 988, at 994 (Tex. 1923).
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the right to immediate possession. The ground that the company's agent becomes the agent of the insured, the reasoning relied upon in the instant case,
has been also adopted in New Jersey. These various theories which are used

to create liability are fictions resorted to by the court in an attempt to settle
the matter equitably, with. no sound legal basis on which to explain them.
However, when the company or its agent is guilty of any unnecessary delay

in mailing or delivering the policy, the courts can logically fix liability on the
tort theory that the company has negligently failed to perform its duty of delivering promptly.

A number of courts still construe the policy by the intent

which is expressed on the face of the instrument, and refuse to allow a recovery where no manual transfer of the policy to.the insured has been effected."

INSURANcE-ExTENSION OF TIME FOR PAYMENT OF PREmiUm-DAYS o'
GRAca--Insured signed a three months' note covering a part of the annual
premium already due on a life insurance policy. The note provided that if it
was not paid when due, without grace, the policy would become void without
further notice. The period of grace after the date for the payment of the premium as provided in the policy was thirty days. Fifteen days after the note
matured, insured died, the note being unpaid. Held, that the policy was in
force for thirty days after the maturity of the note. Askins v. Columbia National Fire Insurance Co., 138 S. E. 177 (S. C. 1927).
In the majority of cases, a clause in a note given for a premium, providing
that non-payment of the note voids the policy, at least during the period of
non-payment, has been enforced.' And the general rule is that the days of
grace provided in the policy are not given to the insured after the date of
maturity of the note given on account of premiums already due.' The .instant
case amounts to the rule that for every postponement of payment allowed by the
insurer, there must be added the days of grace. The court based its decision
'N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 104 Ga. 67, 30 S. E. 273 (1898). See
Note, 42 L. R. A. 91 (1899).
'26 N. J. L. 268, at 279 (857).
'Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on an Application (1927)
75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 207.
"Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 129 Ark. 137, 195 S. W. 371 (917);
Yount v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 179 S. W. 749 (MO. 1915) ; Smith v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 157 Ky. 146, 162 S. W. 779 (1914); Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Stone, 6i Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899).
'Iowa Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 187 U. S.:335 (1902); Wastun v. Lincoln
National Life Ins. Co., 12 F. (2d). 422 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Shawnee Mutual

Fire Ins. Co. v. Cannedy, 36 Okla. 733,

129

Pac. 865

(913).

See Note, 44

L. R. A. (N. S.) 376.
'Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 244 S. W. 989 (Texas App. 1922);
Schmedding v. Northern Assurance Co., 170 Mich. 528, 136 N. W. 361 (1912).
'Martin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., I9O Mo. App. 703, 173 S. W. 266 (915).
(Insured obtained permission to "extend the premium" for three months after
the due date, on payment of $6.oo additional. Held, that the 3o days of grace
applied from the date when the extension came due.)
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partly on the growing practise in construing insurance contracts, that in cases
of ambiguity, that construction would be adopted which would most favor the
insured.' In this case, however, since the note seems clear as to forfeiture,
there should be no room for construction.5 It hardly appears reasonable that
the insurance company intended to give two periods of grace, one on the date
when the premium was due, and the other on the date when the extension was
due, nor, in all probability, did the insured expect to receive it. The decision
seems to go further than the majority of cases in favoring the insured, when
construing the contract.
INTOXICATING LIQuoRs-DErixiNoN OF NuISANcE-Appellants kept a
restaurant to which their patrons were accustomed to bring liquor. No liquor
was sold by the appellants but they knew of and encouraged its use by their
guests and sold ginger ale, ice and other ingredients to mix with the liquor. The
federal statute provides that, "Any room . . . where intoxicating liquor is
manufactured, sold, kept or bartered in violation of this title . . . ishereby
declared to be a common nuisance" 1 and that such nuisance be abated by a year's
closing! This was an action to "padlock" the restaurant. Held, that the
restaurant was a nuisance and should be abated. Fritzel v. United States, 17
F. (2d) 965 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
Several recent cases in Federal Courts are in accord with this decision.!
But the dissenting opinion points out that the Supreme Court, in the only case
in which it has dealt with the meaning of the word "kept" in this connection,
held that, "it plainly means kept for sale or barter or other commercial purpose."' It is argued by the cases in accord with the principal case that there
is sufficient "commercial purpose" in attracting guests and in selling them supplies at exorbitant prices.' It is also urged that the people who bring the
liquor "keep" it there and that the Act does not specify by whom ii must be
kept, and that the character of the place rather than the acts of a particular

' Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 287, 297 (18go) ; First National
Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 95 U. S. 673, 678, 679 (1877).
"Hayworth v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., i9o N. C. 757, 130 S. E. 612
(1925).
141 STAT. 314 (0919), U. S. C. (0925) TIT. XXVII, §33.
241 STAT. 314 (1919)
U. S. C. (1925) trr. XXVII, §34.
'Rossi v. United States, i6 F.(2d) 712 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Notary v.

United States, i6 F. (2d) 434 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); United States v. Budar,
9 F. (2d) 126 (E. D. Wis. ig2s).
' Street v. Lincoln Safe Deposit, 254 U. S.88 (1920). (Liquor legally, obtained, was kept ifn
a warehouse and it was held that no nuisance was maintained.)
Accord: United States v. One Cadillac Touring Car, 274 Fed. 47o (E. D. Mich.
1921) (This follows the Street case and held that liquor in a car crossing the
border was not proved to be "kept," that it must be kept for a commercial purpose) ; Aroniss v. United States, 13 F. (2d) 62o, 622 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926) ("If
the liquor was not kept for that purpose (sale), the place was not a common
nuisance.")
'Rossi v. United States, supra note 3.
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person determines whether it is a nuisance. The dissenting opinion maintains
that the "commercial purpose" must inhere in the liquor itself. It points out
that the word "stored" is used in place of "kept" in other sections of the Act,'
and, also, that at least one legislature thought it necessary to specify that a
place where liquor was brought with the proprietor's knowledge and permission was a nuisance. The argument of the minority of the court contains
sufficient material to present a nice problem when it comes before the Supreme Court.
JURY-PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE-A statute provides that, "a person, indicted for a capital offense, pleading not guilty, shall be entitled to challenge
sixteen of the jurors peremptorily." At the beginning of a murder trial,
the court ruled, "the defense will exercise four, or be charged with four challenges, by the court, first. And the state exercise one, or be charged with one.
And so on, in blocks of four to one." When there were twelve jurors in the
panel, unchallenged for cause, the defendant challenged four peremnptorily.
The state then challenged one. The defendant waived four. The state exercised
another challenge. The defendant waived four more. The state exercised its
third challenge. The defendant waived his fourth four. The state exercised
its last challenge. The juror who was then called to fill the panel not being
objectionable for cause, was challenged peremptorily by the defendant. The
court overruled the challenge. Held, (three justices dissenting) that the challenge was correctly overruled. Lyon v. State, i55 N. E. 8oo (Ohio 1927).
The proposition that it lies within the discretion of the trial court to determine the order in which peremptory challenges shall be exercised is generally
accepted as sound. The theory of the decision in the principal case is that the
ruling in question only determined that order. But the weight of authority
is that such a ruling not only determines that order, but also limits the right of
peremptory challenge, and, in so doing, deprives a defendant of a substantial
right. The principal case is irreconcilable with the previous Ohio cases
on the subject.' In Benigno v. State,' a ruling of the trial court that chal-

'Rossi v. United States, supra note 3; United States v. Gaffney, io F. (2d)
694, 6Q6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; United States v. Ward, 6 F. (2d) 182 (C. C. A.
3d, 1925).
'41 STAT. 3I4 (1919), U. S. C. (925)
TIT. XXVII, §34.
"IND. ANN. STAT. (Supp.
i918) §8356& et seq; Brown v. State, 196 Ind.
77, 147 N. E. 136 (i925) ; Shelton v. State, i9i nd. 228, 132 N. E. 594 (1921).
'OHio GEr. CODE (Page,

ig2o) §13647.

"Pointer v. U. S., 151 U. S. 396 (1893); Commonwealth v. Piper, 120
Mass. I85 (1876) ; Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470 (1903).
'U. S. v. Daubner, 17 Fed. 793 (E. D. Wis. 1883); Commonwealth v.
Brown, supra note 2; Schumaker v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856). Contra: State
v. Pierce, 8 Iowa 231 (859).
'Benigno v. State, 16 Ohio App. 383 (1922) ; State v. Koch, 32 Ohio St.
352 (1877).

9Supra note 4.
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lenges should be made in the same manner as in the principal case, but
which added, "such method would not operate to deprive either party of his
right to exercise the full number of peremptory challenges allowed by the
statute," was affirmed. In State v. Koch" it was held to be error for the trial
court, under a statute allowing a defendant two peremptory challenges, to
refuse-to allow the defendant a second challenge, after he had challenged once,
and passed once, and the state had challenged twice. It is submitted that the
holding in the principal case amounts to ruling that a defendant may only
peremptorily challenge sixteen of the first nineteen talesmen whq are not objectionable for cause; whereas the statute" provides that he may peremptorily
challenge any sixteen.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES

TO THIRD

PERSONS-

DELEGATION-A helper, with no authority, express or implied, in the presence
of and with the consent of the chauffeur, who had no authority to delegate
his duties, drove a truck forward to assist in unloading it, and in so doing
negligently injured plaintiff. Hild, that the master is liable. Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller, 138 At. i (Md. 1927).
By the well-established rules of agency, a master is not liable for the
negligence of one to whom his servant delegates his duties, in the absence
of express or implied authority to do so, or an emergency sufficient to justify
such delegation.' The contrary decision of the principal case, and the decisions of those jurisdictions in accord with it, are supported by one or both
of two lines of reasoning.

The first is that one who assists a servant in the

performance of his duties in his presence and with his consent is the mere
instrumentality or tool of the servant, whose negligence is attributable to the
servant himself, and for which the master is responsible. It would seem that
this reasoning is a misapplication of the doctrine that an agent can depute
a mere mechanical duty not requiring skill or discretion.' The second is that
in permitting another to perform his duties the servant is guilty of negli'Supra note 4.
"Supra note i.
'Gwilliam v. Twist, [1895] 2 Q. B. 84; Hills v. Strong,

Ill. App. 174
(emergency)
Pennsvlvania is in accord with this view. Kirk v. Showell, Fryer & Co., 276
132

(19o7) ;- Hollidge v. Duncan, ig Mass. 121, 85 N. E. 186 (I908)

Pa. 587, i2o Atl. 670 (1923).

'This principle was announced in Booth v. Mister, 7 Carr. and P. 66
(1835). Abinger, C. B., reserved the point, but no motion was made on it.
This case, though not specifically overruled, is no longer followed in England.
Harris v. Fiat Mot6rs, 22 T. L. R. 556 (igo6). It was approved in Althorf
v. Wolfe, 22 N. Y. 355 (186o), and New York is now committed to this view,
Ellefson v. Singer, 132 App. Div. 89, 116 N. Y. Supp. 453 (igog), as is also Minnesota, Geiss v. Twin City Co., i2o Minn. 368, [39 N. W. 61I (1913).
'Burial Board v. Thompson, L. R. 6 C. P. 445 (187o) ; Estill County v.
Embry, 144 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 6th, i9o6). It will be noted in the cases cited in
note 2 supra that the courts apply his reasoning without regard to whether the
duty delegated required skill or not.
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gence which is an effective cause of the injury.' This is perhaps the more
satisfactory basis for liability, if carefully applied, but in using it the courts
do not always take cognizance of the fact that to delegate a duty, though disobedient, is not necessarily negligent. It would seem that the principal case
unjustifiably extends the liabilities of a master.
Powers-ExERcisE OF A GENERAL PowER-The testator was the donee of a
general power of appointment under his mother's will. By will he provided: "I
give and beqdeath to my wife such share of my estate as she is entitled to under
the intestate laws of the state of Pennsylvania. And all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate real, personal and mixed of whatever kind and wheresoever
situate of which I may die seized and possessed, I give, devise and bequeath to
my two sisters share and share alike . . ." Held, (i) that the power was
executed by virtue of the will, and (2) that the wife shared in both the personal
and power estates. Blackburne's Estate, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, decided May I6, 1927, affirming Blackburne's Estate, 8 D. & C. 655 (Pa. iyz7).
This decision shows effectively to what lengths the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania will go in determining that a general testamentary power of
appointment is exercised under the Wills Act of T917.1 Formerly it was essential to show the intent to execute,2 but since the passage of the Wills Act a
general bequest without any reference to the power whatsoever exercises that
power. A contrary intent must be shown in order to defeat an exercise of the
power under such circumstances. The Act also has the effect of shifting the
burden of proof heretofore prevailing at common law.' The majority of states
have enacted a similar statute to that in force in Pennsylvania,' but as yet
courts of other states have not been forced to construe the precise
language here presented. In the principal case the court followed Howell's
Estate,' which held that very similar phrasing (general bequest "according to
'Englehart v. Farrant, [1897] i Q. B. 240 (which carefully applies the
rules of negligence to this situation). In the later American cases this reasoning is almost always used in conjunction with the instrumentality theory. Geiss
v. Twin City Co., supra note 2; Bamberg v. International Ry. Co., 53 Misc.
403, IO3 N. Y. Supp. 297 (907).

'Act of 1917, P. L. 403 §n, PA. STAT. (West, Ig2o) §8319 provides that:

"A general devise of real estate of a testator shall be construed to include any
real estate which he may have power to appoint and shall operate an execution
of such power unless a contrary intention shall appear by will. In like manner
a bequest of

. . .

personal property described in a general manner shall

be construed to include any personal estate which he may have the power to
appoint in any manner he may think proper and shall operate as an execution
of such power unless contrary intention appear by will."
-Lee v. Simpson, 134 U. S. 572 (I889) ; Johnson v. Stanton, 3o Conn. 297
(I86I) ; Birdsall v. Richards, i8 Pa. 256 (1852).
'See §II of the Wills Act, spra.
"See Lee v. Simpson, Johnson v. Stanton, Birdsall v. Richards, all supra
note 3.
'See Note, 64 L. R. A. 882 (i9o4).
6I85 Pa. 350, 39 Atl. 966 (I898).
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intestate laws") exercised the power and determined merely the proportions to be received by the heirs. Besides this precedent the court found
further argument to support its conclusion. The testator used the words "my
estate" in both provisions of his will. Hence the rule that the same descriptive
terms repeated in the same instrument are to be given the same construction
became distinctly applicable.' It was clear that, under the statute, testator by
the words "my estate" in the general residuary clause bequeathed both his
personal and appointed estates. Therefore, it was argued, he also referred
to both estates by use of the identical words in the bequest to his wife. It is
submitted that this decision carried out the real intent of the testator, because
the ordinary man considers as his own all that property which he may dispose
of by will.'
TAXATION- SuccssIoN TAx-CoNTRAcT To BEQUEATH-The state
assessed a tax, under the provisions of the Succession Tax Act,' upon a judgment recovered by the appellant.against the estate of the deceased, for breach
of a contract to bequeath a sum of money. Held, that the state cannot recover
the tax, for the judgment was not a transfer by will or by the intestate laws.
Bente v. Bugbee, 137 Atl. 552 (N. J. 1927).

An inheritance tax is not a tax upon property, but upon the privilege of
succeeding to, or acquiring, property under a will, the privilege being created
and regulated by statute? In New York, a similar recovery was held to be a
transfer by will, subject to tax,' on the theory that the devolution of the property was under the will, since equity, in enforcing an agreement of this character, will convert the devisees under the will into trustees for the performance
of the original agreement. 4 The lower New Jersey court" accepted this theory,
adding, "that the effect of the judgment was merely to restore the status as it
would have been before the erasure was made." The appellate court reversed
Eliot v. Carter, 12 Pick. 436 (Mass. 1832) ; Carr v. Smith, 16i N. Y. 636,
57 N. E. iio6 (igoo); Altdorfer's Estate, 225 Pa. 136, 73 At. io68 (igog).
'Thompson v. Fidelity Trust Co., 268 Pa. 203 at 214, iio Atl. 77o at 773
(192o).
N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp. 1924) c. 2o8, §537. There shall be a tax,
"when the transfer is by will or the intestate laws of this State from any one
dying seized or possessed of property while a resident of this State."
'Neilson v. Russell, 76 N. J.L. 27, 69 Atl. 476 (9o8); In re Wolf's
Estate, 89 App. Div. 349, 85 N . Y. Supp. 949 (I9O3) aff'd. in 179 N. Y. 599,
72 N. E. 1152 (904).
'In re Kidd's Estate, i86 N. Y. 274, 8o N. E. 924 (903).
"Phalen v. United States Trust Company, i86 N. Y. 182, 78 N. E. 945
(1906) : "Though a will is always revocable and the-last must always be the
testator's will, yet a man may so bind his assets by agreement, that his will
shall be trustee for the performance of that agreement. There is no difference
between promising to make a will in such a form, and making a will with a
promise not to revoke."

Bolman v. Overall, 8o Ala. 451, 2 So. 624 (1887).

But see opinion of O'Brien, J., in his dissent; United States Trust Company
v. Phalen, supra at 193, 194, 199, 202.
'Bente v. Bugbee, 134 At. i85 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
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the court below, maintaining that no principle of equity was involved, but only
the question of statutory intendment; that since the judgment was for a contract price, or damages for the breach thereof, it was in the nature of a debt,
6
A means employed to gain specific
which is not taxable under the statute
performance of a contract, or to recover a judgment in a court of law, must
not be confused with the nature and effect of the judgment or decree obtained.
Although the contract right in this case arose from a contract to devise, it
seems that the court properly held the judgment resulting from such right to
be a debt. Moreover, it is within the province of the legislature to amend or
modify the terms of the statute so as to include the recovery under question.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE

OF PARENT IMPUTED TO INFANT-Anl

action was

brought in behalf of an infant, six months old, who was injured, due to the
negligence of the defendants while riding in an automobile negligently driven
by the child's father. Held, that the negligence of the father is imputed to the
child, and the minor plaintiff cannot recover. County Commissioners v. Beulah,
138 AtI. 25 (Md. 1927).
There is a conflict in the decisions as to whether the negligence of a parent
can be imputed to a child. The affirmative of this proposition was first propounded in an early New York case' and it has been followed ii a few jurisdictions,' but the great majority of courts have repudiated it because of the lack
of any logical legal theory by which the rule might be supported, and, also, because of the injustice it works toward infants. Most cases supporting the doctrine are confined to the situation in which the conduct of the infant did not
"Wood v. Chetwood, 44 N. J. Eq. 64, 14 Atl. 21 (1888), aff'd. in'45 N. J.
Eq. 369, i9 Atl. 622 (1889) ; In re Quinn's Estate, 13 Phila. 34o (Pa. i88o), followed in Estate of James Gibbons, 16 Phila. 218 (Pa. 1883). See Paul's Estate,
i D. & C. 232 (Pa. 1921). Contra: Clarke v. Treasurer and Recording General,
226 Mass. 3oi, 115 N. E. 416 (917); Matter of Wood, 40 Misc. 155, 8 N. Y.
Supp. 511 (1903).
For an exhaustive summation of authorities, see Note, I5 A. L. R. 414
(1921).

-'Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (1839). In this case the court seemed
to be groping towards a theory of agency for the support of their decision.
An infant is not sui juris. He belongs to another, to whom discretion
in the care of his person is exclusively confided. That person is keeper and
agent for this purpose and in respect to third persons, his act must be deemed
that of the infant, his neglect, the infant's neglect." Bearing in mind that an
infant has no choice in the selection of his parent or guardian, and that he has
no control over the conduct of the latter, it is submitted that the view of the
court does not bear analysis.
'Leslie v. Lewiston, 62 Maine 468 (1873) ; Sullivan v. Chadwick, 236 Mass.
130, 127 N. E. 632 (1920); Baltimore City Passenger Ry. v. McDonnell, 43
Contra: Chicago & Great Western R. R. v. Kowalski, 92
Md. 534 (1875).
Fed. 31o (1899) ; Lovas v. Independent Breweries Co., 199 Ill. App. 6o (1916);
Philadelphia & Reading R. R. v. Long, 75 Pa. 257 (1874).
' "Can it be true, and is such the law, that if only one party offends against
an infant he has his action, but that if two offend against him, their faults
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'conform to the standard of care which would be demanded of an adult.5 But the
principal case is one of a class which has gone even further, and imputed the
parents negligence to the child, when the conduct of the child was all that could
be required of an adult. It is generally settled that the negligence of the driver
of a vehicle cannot be imputed to a passenger, unless a relationship of master and
servant existed between them or unless they were engaged in a joint enterprise4
It is difficult to see why there should be a departure from this rule when the
plaintiff is an infant, especially in view of the well recognized policy of the law
to extend special protection to persons not sui juris. However, the decision of
the principal case can be supported upon the rather doubtful practical ground,
that it is in fact the negligent parent, and not the injured infant, who receives
the benefit of the damages awarded.
WnS-CONTRACT TO MAKE A WILL-INJUNCTIoN AGAINST THREATENED

WiL-Defendant contracted to execute and leave at her death
a will devising all property she should then own to plaintiff and not to revoke
such will. Defendant executed the will in accordance with the contract and
later threatened to revoke it. Plaintiff brought a bill to enjoin defendant from
breaking the contract and defendant demurred. Held, that the demurrer should
have been overruled. Lovett v. Lovett, 157 N. E. io4 (Ind. App. I927).
It is a general rule that contracts to make a will are enforceable' but
action has rarely been brought until after the promisor's death. It has
been held that an action at law for damages arose as soon as the promisor
conveyed specific property which is the subject of the contract
But with a
contract like the one in the principal case, the damages would be purely speculative because the promisor might not own any property at her death. A stronger
case for allowing an immediate action for damages can be made out when the
promisor actually conveys specific property which he has contracted absolutely
to leave by will. If he merely announces his intention not to be bound by the
contract, he may change his mind at any time before death. Hence the general
rule is that the promisee cannot maintain an immediate action for damages
on the mere repudiation of the contract by the promisor.
Furthermore, in
REVOCATiON OF

neutralize each other, and he is without remedy?" Bellefontaine, etc., R. R.
v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399, 409 (1863). "The doctrine of Hartfield v. Roper
imposes burdens and hardships upon the helpless infant that are manifestly
unjust. It is opposed by the great weight of modem authorities, and by sound
judicial reason." Warren v. Manchester Street Ry., 7o N. H. 352, 361, 47
Atl. 735, 738 (900).

"McGarry v. Loomis, 63 N. Y. io4 (1875); Sullivan v. Chadwick, supra
note 3.
'Noonan v. Consolidated Traction Co., 64 N. J.L. 579, 46 Atl. 770 (1900);
Ward v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., i9o N. Y. 559, 83 N. E. 1134 (i9o8) ; Little
v. Central District & Printing Telegraph Co., 213 Pa. 229, 62 Atl. 848 (I9O6).
'Johnson v. Hubbell, io N. J.Eq. 332 (1855); Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N.
Y. 480 (1869); (915)
63 U. OF PA. L. REv. 811. See Note on Johnson v.
Hubbell, 66 Am. DEc. 784.
"Synge v. Synge, [1894] 1 Q. B. 466.
'Warden v. Hinds, 163 Fed. 201 (C. C. A. 4th, i9o8). Cf. Edwards v.
Slate, 184 Mass. 317, 68 N. E. 342 (903).

RECENT CASES

III

determining when the statute of limitations begins to run on a contract to
make a will, it is generally held that the cause of action does not arise until
the promisor died.' The property mentioned in the contract in the principal case
is not specific real estate or chattels but is merely such property as the defendant shall own at her death. The decision appears to be novel in holding that,
under these circumstances, action to enjoin revocation of the will may be
maintained during the lifetime of the promisor. When specific property forms
the subject matter of the contract to make a will, a court of equity may, on the
principle of quia timet, enjoin the promisor from conveying the property or
doing any act which would make it impossible to perform the contract.' A
usual method is to decree a trust in favor of the promisee. In Pennsylvania,
the will is held to have become a part of an executed contract and acts in violation of the contract are of no effect inter partes.7 In this sense, such a will
is not ambulatory. However, no case has apparently arisen in that state where
action has been brought during the life of the promisor. Under the Pennsylvania view, so long as the promisor does not, by conveying the propertyj actually
put it out of his power to carry out the contract, there seems to be no occasion
for equity to enjoin an attempted repudiation which would be a mere nullity.
The practical effect of the relief granted in the principal case is to make the
validity of the contract a matter of record during the lifetime ok the parties.
It removes the difficulty, encountered years later after the death of the promisor, of establishing the existence of the contract.
'Story v. Story, 61 S. W. 279 (Ky. IgOI) ; Camn v. Cann, 40 W. Va. x48,
20 S. E. 910 (18(4).
'Newman.v. French, 138 Iowa 482, II6 N. W. 468 (I9O8); Brackenbury
v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, io2 Atl. io6 (1917); Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 41
N. W. 514 (I889).

'Supra note 5; Duvale v. Duvale, 54 N. J. Eq. 58, 35 At. 75o (1896).
'In re McGinley's Estate, 257 Pa. 478, ior Atl. 8o7 (1917); Smith v.
Tuit, 127 Pa. 34r, 17 Atl. 995 (1889); Johnson v. McCue, 34 Pa. x8o (z859).

